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ABSTRACT 
No margin, no mission?  
A Field Experiment on Incentives for Pro-Social Tasks* 
A substantial body of research investigates the design of incentives in firms, 
yet less is known about incentives in organizations that hire individuals to 
perform tasks with positive social spillovers. We conduct a field experiment in 
which agents hired by a public health organization are randomly allocated to 
four groups. Agents in the control group receive a standard volunteer contract 
often offered for this type of task, whereas agents in the three treatment 
groups receive small financial rewards, large financial rewards, and non-
financial rewards, respectively. The analysis yields three main findings. First, 
non-financial rewards are more effective at eliciting effort than either financial 
rewards or the volunteer contract. The effect of financial rewards, both large 
and small, is much smaller and not significantly different from zero. Second, 
non-financial rewards elicit effort both by leveraging intrinsic motivation for the 
cause and by facilitating social comparison among agents. Third, contrary to 
existing laboratory evidence, financial incentives do not crowd out intrinsic 
motivation in this setting.  
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1 Introduction
Understanding what drives individuals to devote time and e ort to di erent endeavors is a question
that lies at the core of the social sciences. The answer is crucial both to understanding observed be-
havior and to designing incentive mechanisms that align the individuals’ interests with the interests
of the organization with which they are a liated. As a consequence, the design of optimal incentive
contracts has been the subject of extensive economic research, both theoretical and empirical.
Empirical contributions, however, mainly focus on the e ect of financial rewards in settings
in which employee e ort only benefits the employer (Bandiera et al. 2005, 2007, Lazear 2000).
Very little attention has been paid to incentives in organizations, such as NGOs and charities, that
pursue goals with positive social externalities and hire agents to perform pro-social tasks, namely
tasks that create benefits enjoyed by those other than the employer and employees. Our paper
begins to fill this gap by providing evidence from a field experiment designed to evaluate the e ect
of di erent incentive mechanisms on the performance of agents in a public health organization.
The theoretical literature suggests two reasons for why evidence from the private sector provides
limited guidance on the design of e ective incentive mechanisms for pro-social tasks, and for sectors
that consist primarily of such tasks. First, mission-driven organizations benefit from matching with
workers whose interests are aligned with the mission (Besley and Ghatak 2005) and these individuals
might put low weight on financial gains. Second, to the extent that agents are motivated by
pro-social or intrinsic motivation, financial incentives could actually reduce or “crowd out” such
motivation, and reduce overall performance (Bénabou and Tirole 2003, 2006), especially when
incentives are low powered (Gneezy and Rustichini 2000). These considerations raise the need for
an alternative reward scheme, which can give agents a non-monetary stake in success and leverage
the intrinsic motivation agents have for the pro-social task. Moreover, alternative rewards could
provide a cost-e ective path for providing incentives to workers.
We implement a field experiment to test the e ect of both financial and non-financial rewards on
the performance of agents engaged in a task that has a pro-social component: the promotion and sale
of female condoms for HIV prevention. To this end, we collaborate with a public health organization
based in Lusaka, Zambia, that hires and trains hairdressers and barbers to sell condoms in their
shops.1 The experiment randomly assigns 1222 agents located in 200 distinct geographical areas
to one of four groups. Agents in the control group receive a standard volunteer contract o ered by
1Using embedded community agents for health delivery is extremely common in developing countries, where
community volunteers are often called upon to deliver needed services. For instance, as of June 2007, BRAC, one of
the world’s largest NGOs, relied on 67,000 community members to deliver basic health services to a population of
31 million in Bangladesh (BRAC 2007). In another well-documented example, community health workers in Uganda
e ectively distribute injectable contraceptives in rural communities (Stanback et al. 2007). School teachers are often
relied on in health interventions to impart information and promote behavioral change among their students (see,
as a successful example, teachers promoting safe water and hygiene, O’Reilly et al. 2008). However, the question of
how to compensate these community agents remains a challenge for many non-profit employers (Bhattacharaya et al.
2001, Mathauer and Imho  2006).
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NGOs, whereas agents in the three treatment groups receive small financial rewards, large financial
rewards, and non-financial rewards, respectively. Financial incentives are provided by giving a
margin on each condom sale, whereas the non-financial scheme provides social recognition in the
form of stars posted on a thermometer displaying condom sales (“star” treatment).
We develop a simple theoretical framework to make precise how the e ect of financial and non-
financial incentives depends on the agents’ type, namely on the weight they put on their monetary
gains and on their contribution to the social good. In particular, we allow for the latter, “intrinsic”,
motivation to be crowded out by financial incentives, and thus for the possibility that financial
incentives reduce performance.
Informed by these theoretical insights, we collect a direct and quantitative measure of the
agents’ motivation for the cause through a modified altruism (dictator) game.2 The donation in
the experimental game is a strong predictor of sale performance; agents who donate more than the
median sell 51 percent more condoms than the average agent in the control group. We complement
this measure by collecting information on a host of agents’ characteristics that can proxy for their
underlying motivation for selling condoms and their responsiveness to financial incentives, such as
self-reported motivation for choosing hairdressing as their primary occupation and socio-economic
status.
Our design has three further features that allows us to shed light on the e ect of financial
and non-financial incentives and the underlying mechanisms. First, we o er both small and large
financial rewards to test the hypothesis that motivation crowding-out is particularly detrimental
to performance when rewards are small as argued in Gneezy and Rustichini (2000). Second, we
measure agents’ performance monthly over a one year period, thus allowing a longer follow up than
in many employee experiments where changes in behavior may be artifacts of the experimental
design, due to novelty or Hawthorne e ects. Third, we exploit naturally occurring variation in the
density of agents in each geographical sales area to provide evidence on whether social comparisons
drive the response to incentives in this setting.
We find that non-financial incentives are e ective at promoting sales, while the e ect of financial
incentives is much smaller and not significantly di erent from zero. Agents in the star treatment
sell over twice as many condoms as agents in any other group, and the di erence exists both on the
extensive and intensive margins. Agents in the star treatment are 12 percentage points more likely
to make any sale (a 32 percent increase with respect to the mean of the control group) and the
di erence is larger at higher quantiles of sales. We show that the di erential e ect of non-financial
rewards is stable throughout the one-year period, ruling out that this is driven by a novelty e ect.
Our research design allows us to rule out that the star treatment increases sales by a ecting
demand, e.g. through advertising. Our strategy has three prongs. First, we survey a random
2As is customary in economics we use the term “intrinsic motivation” to refer to the motivation for the task that
relates to its pro-social e ects. In contrast, the psychology literature distinguishes between intrinsic and pro-social
motivation (both of which can be crowded-out)
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sample of customers to probe the e ectiveness of promotional materials such as posters that are
given to agents in all treatments vis-a-vis the thermometer that is only given to agents in the
star treatment. The survey reveals that customers are aware of the former but not of the latter.
Second, we implement a “placebo star reward” treatment, namely we randomly allocate a subsample
of salons in treatments other than the star treatment to receive a thermometer that looks identical
to the treatment thermometer except that it reports the average sales in the area, rather than
individual sales. In contradiction with the advertising hypothesis, we find that the placebo star
reward has no e ect on sales. Finally, we show that agents in the star treatment behave di erently
on dimensions that are correlated with sales e ort, such as displaying promotional materials and
filling in sales records.
Further analysis indicates that non-financial incentives work through two channels: they lever-
age intrinsic motivation for the cause and they facilitate social comparison among agents. In
support of the first channel we find that non-financial incentives are more than twice as e ective
for agents who are motivated for the cause, as measured both by their donation in the dictator
game and by personal characteristics correlated with motivation. In support of the second, we
find that the marginal e ect of non-financial incentives is increasing in the number of neighboring
salons that received the same treatment, whereas the e ect of the other incentive mechanisms is
zero throughout. Finally, in contrast to existing laboratory evidence, we find no evidence that
financial incentives crowd out intrinsic motivation. On the contrary, high financial rewards are
more e ective for agents who score higher on our motivation measure.
Our paper is the first to provide evidence from a field experiment designed to compare financial
and non-financial incentives for employees in a social organization. We contribute to a new and
rapidly growing literature that uses field experiments to identify the causal e ect of incentives on
performance. The literature to date has focused on financial incentives for private sector employees
(see Bandiera et al. 2011 for a review), and for teachers, especially in developing countries (Glewwe
et al. 2010, Muralidharan and Sundararaman 2011). While recent theoretical contributions make
precise the role of non-financial incentives, especially status awards (Besley and Ghatak 2008,
Moldovanu et al. 2007), evidence on the e ectiveness of these in the workplace remain scarce. A
recent exception is Kosfeld and Neckermann (2010) who design a field experiment to evaluate the
e ect of symbolic awards for students hired for an occasional two-hour data entry job for an NGO.
In line with our findings, they also show that symbolic awards—in their case a congratulation card
to the best performer—are e ective at eliciting e ort.3 In addition, however, our design allows for a
comparison between the e ectiveness of financial and non-financial rewards in the same setting and
a test of whether such e ects are sustained over an entire year, thus separating novelty e ects from
long-run e ort responses. Evidence on the e ectiveness of recognition and status rewards also comes
3Frey and Neckermann (2008) review psychology literature on awards and, along with Neckermann, Cueni and
Frey (2010), provide additional evidence that awards are e ective in for-profit settings.
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from recent field studies on gift exchange (Kube et al 2011), recent laboratory experiments (Alpizar
et al. 2008, Ball et al. 2011, Eriksson and Villeval 2010) and from pro-social behavior outside the
workplace, e.g. blood donations and charitable giving (Lacetera and Macis 2008, Landry et al.
2011, Soetevent 2005). Our paper also contributes to the literature on crowding out by providing
the first evidence from the workplace to complement existing evidence from laboratory and field
experiments on charitable giving (Ariely et al. 2009, Gneezy and Rustichini 2000, Lacetera et al.
2011, Mellström and Johannesson 2008).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a basic theoretical framework to
guide the empirical analysis, Section 3 describes the context, data sources and the research design.
Section 4 discusses the identification strategy. Section 5 and 6 present the findings and Section 7
concludes with a discussion of external validity.
2 Theoretical Framework
2.1 Set-up
We develop the simplest possible theoretical framework that allows us to examine the di erence
between financial and non-financial incentives in our setting. The framework is designed to capture
the fact that individuals might derive utility both from money and from the production of social
value, and that financial incentives might crowd out the latter. There is one principal, “the organi-
zation” that hires one agent to produce output Y, where Y = f(e) + Á, e is the agents’ e ort, and
Á is a random shock with mean 0 and variance Í2, so that E(Y ) = f(e).
Output has positive externalities for the community. To use our empirical context as an example,
Y represents condom sales that generate both revenue for the organization and positive externalities
in the local community by slowing down the transmission of HIV. E ort is non-observable, and
because of the random disturbance Á, Y is not a perfect signal for it, so the organization cannot
infer e by observing Y . We assume that f Õ > 0, f ÕÕ Æ 0, namely output is increasing in agent’s
e ort, at a non-increasing rate. We assume both parties are risk neutral.
We assume that the agent’s payo  has two components. The first is the financial rewards
he gets from the organization. The second is the non-monetary payo  he gets from contributing
to the cause, that is, from producing output that entails positive externalities for others in his
community. This captures the fact that agents in social organizations might be motivated to exert
e ort “intrinsically”, even if their performance does not a ect their monetary pay-o . We analyze
the case when the organization has two instruments to leverage the monetary and non-monetary
components of the agent’s payo , respectively. The organization can a ect the agent’s monetary
pay-o  by o ering financial bonuses. In addition, the organization can a ect the agent’s non-
monetary payo  by o ering non-financial rewards, such as recognition or status goods, linked to
performance. For simplicity and ease of comparison we assume that both financial and non-financial
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rewards are a linear function of performance, but the spirit of the analysis and the results would
be similar if we were to assume di erent functional forms, e.g. a lump sum bonus once a threshold
is reached.
The agent’s monetary payo  is „(w+mE(Y (e)), where „ is the weight the agent gives to money,
w is the baseline wage and m is the financial bonus. The agent’s non-monetary payo  is equal
to ‡(1 + r)E(Y (e))c(m), where ‡ the weight the agent gives to non-monetary benefits whereas
r measures the level of non-financial incentives o ered by the organization.4 The specification
captures the intuition that agents “care” about the organization’s performance even if they are not
given incentives for it.
The last term, c(m),cÕ Æ 0, c(0) = 1, captures the possibility that non-monetary benefits are
crowded out by financial rewards. The formulation is a reduced form representation of many types
of social preferences, and many motives for crowding-out. For instance, it might be that the agent
cares about E(Y (e)) because he is altruistic towards the people who benefit from the output he
produces—such as, from the example above, those whose risk of HIV infection is lowered by condom
use—or because he cares about acquiring a reputation for altruism with others in his community
(Bénabou and Tirole 2003, 2006, Ariely et al. 2009). Finally, we assume that e ort is costly for
the agent, and denote the disutility of e ort by d(e), dÕ > 0, dÕÕ > 0 .
2.2 The optimal response to incentives and crowding-out
The agent chooses e ort to maximize:
maxe{„(w +mE(Y (e)) + ‡(1 + r)E(Y (e))c(m)≠ d(e)} (2.1)
s.t. e Ø 0. The optimal level of e ort eú satisfies the first order condition:
„mf Õ(e) + ‡(1 + r)f Õ(e)c(m) = dÕ(e) (2.2)
where the first and second terms represent the marginal benefit of e ort on monetary and non-
monetary pay-o s, respectively. The first order condition makes clear that the agent has two
motives to exert e ort in this setting, namely to increase earnings and to contribute to a cause he
cares about. Note that if ‡ = 0, i.e. if the agent does not care about the cause, e ort levels are
solely determined by financial incentives, so that the agent exerts the minimum feasible amount
of e ort if his pay is not tied to performance (m = 0). Note also that if ‡ > 0, the optimal level
4Alternatively, it could be argued that the agent’s non-monetary payo  depends on the level of e ort he devotes
to the cause, instead of the output that e ort produces. We prefer this specification because in our experiment the
non-monetary incentives r are a function of output, not e ort. Moreover, given the assumption of risk neutrality, the
two formulations are equivalent in our theoretical setting. If the agent were risk averse, however, the level of utility
from contributing to the cause would di er depending on whether we model the non-monetary payo  as a function
of e ort or output.
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of e ort is positive even if the agent is not o ered a non-financial reward (r = 0). This captures
the fact that agents who are intrinsically motivated for the cause (‡ > 0) exert e ort even in the
absence of tangible rewards.




Õ(eú) + ‡(1 + r)f Õ(eú)cÕ(m)
„mf ÕÕ(eú) + ‡(1 + r)f ÕÕ(eú)c(m) . (2.3)
By the second order condition the denominator is negative, so the sign of (2.3) is determined by
the sign of the numerator. The first term in the numerator is positive and represents the increase
in monetary payo , the second term is negative and represents the decrease in non-monetary payo 
due to the fact that an increase in the strength of financial incentives crowds out intrinsic motivation
(cÕ(m) < 0). Equation (2.3) thus illustrates that when agents are intrinsically motivated, financial
incentives can backfire and reduce e ort if the crowding-out e ect is stronger than the direct e ect
of the monetary payo . This is more likely to occur when the agent’s weight on monetary payo  „
is low and when his weight on non-monetary payo  ‡ is high. The data contains proxies of „ and ‡
that can be used to test whether the e ect of financial incentives is heterogeneous as predicted by
the theory. Moreover, the shape of the crowding-out function c(.) determines the magnitude of this
e ect at di erent levels of incentive power m. For instance, cÕÕ(.) < 0 would imply that motivation
crowding-out is particularly detrimental to performance when incentives are low powered as argued
in Gneezy and Rustichini (2000).





„mf ÕÕ(eú) + ‡rf ÕÕ(eú)c(m) (2.4)
which is always positive, since ‡f Õ(eú)c(m) > 0. Namely, there is no drawback to increasing the
power of non-financial incentives since they do not crowd out any type of motivation.5 The strength
of non-financial incentives depends on the weight the agent puts on his non-financial pay-o  ‡, i.e.
on how much he cares about the cause. We will test for this by allowing the e ect of non-financial
incentives to be a function of the empirical proxy of ‡.
3 Context and Research Design
3.1 Context
The field experiment was run in collaboration the Society for Family Health (SFH), a public health
organization based in Lusaka, Zambia. The experiment was embedded in SFH’s new program for
5In the psychology literature, there is the notion that any kind of extrinsic reward, including non-financial rewards,
could potentially crowd out intrinsic motivation. However, non-financial rewards have been shown to be far less likely
to crowd out intrinsic motivation (Deci, Koestner and Ryan 1999).
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the distribution of female condoms through hair salons, and we collaborated with SFH closely at
each stage of the program, including salon selection, training, incentive design and monthly sales
monitoring for one year from December 2009 to December 2010.6
Like many NGOs in developing countries, SFH relies on community members to implement
health programs. These agents are typically chosen for their role in the community (e.g., teachers,
community leaders) and engage in pro-social public health related tasks in addition to their main
income generating activities. In the program under study, hairstylists were identified as ideal
promoters of female condoms both because the familiarity between the stylist and the client creates
the potential for successful targeting of female condom to “at risk” customers, and because during
the period that a client is in the salon, he or she is a captive audience, allowing the stylist to provide
information about the condom. Finally, hair salons are numerous and distributed throughout the
city. Our census of salons, implemented as part of the research design, found just over 2500
hair salons, serving a population of about 2 million (2,198,996, according to the 2010 Census of
Population and Housing for Zambia).
The first stage of the program consists in distributing invitation letters to hairstylists. The
letters invite them to attend a one-day training program after which they are given the opportunity
to join the female condom distribution program. In case of multi-stylists salons, the invitation is
extended to the person responsible for the management of the salon, which is either the owner or,
if they are not directly involved in salon activities, the general manager. During training, stylists
are provided with information on HIV/AIDS, female condom promotion, basic business skills and
program details, including the compensation package.7
At the end of training, stylists decide whether to join the program. Those who join buy
condoms from SFH to sell in their shops. The purchase and resale price is set at K500 for a
pack of two condoms, the same price as the male condom.8 SFH provides a range of promotional
materials including posters and display units, and SFH representatives (“monitors”) visit salons
once a month to allow stylists to buy more condoms and answer queries about the program. Stylists
can purchase their first condom dispenser (containing 12 packs) at training at the subsidized price
of K2000. After that, dispensers or single packs can be purchased at K500 per pack either at the
6Female condoms are embraced by many in the public health community as the only female-controlled tool
for HIV/AIDS and other STI prevention (PATH, UNFPA 2006). Young, married women are the fastest growing
demographic infected with HIV (UNAIDS et al. 2004). Adoption rates for female condoms are higher in sub-Saharan
Africa than in most parts of the world and earlier work in Zambia indicates that both men and women have expressed
interest in the female condom (HLSP 2007).
7Participants were o ered a K40,000 show up fee. This is about eight times the average price of a hair wash service
and is thus likely to cover the stylists’ opportunity cost of time for a week day. In 2009, USD 1 = K5,000.The training
took place between October and December 2009 and lasted for 40 days, running from Monday through Thursday for
10 weeks, with a maximum of 50 stylists attending in a single day. Training program and materials were designed by
the research team in consultation with external communication experts. The training was conducted using a variety
of pedagogical approaches (lectures, exercises, games, role-play, etc.) and teaching material (individual handouts,
flipcharts, videos, etc.).
8During implementation USD 1 = ~5000 Zambian Kwacha.
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monthly visit or by phoning a toll-free number service dedicated to the female condom program.
The number was set up to allow agents to purchase condoms if they miss the monthly visit, or if
they run out in between visits.9
In this context, the agents’ choice variable is the level of e ort to devote to the promotion and
sale of female condoms. Since this is a new product, unfamiliar to customers, the agents have
to exert e ort in explaining the female condom’s proper use and benefits to persuade customers
to make a purchase. For repeat customers, the hair stylists have the opportunity to follow up to
encourage repeat use and troubleshoot any barriers to future purchase. E ort is costly in terms of
forgone time spent discussing other topics that might be either more enjoyable or lead to the sale
of other products available in the salon, such as clothes or hair products.
Promoting female condoms has a strong pro-social component since the use of condoms creates
positive externalities for society at large. Condoms are an e ective means of preventing the spread
of HIV/AIDS, which undermines economic growth in many sub-Saharan countries. Zambia has one
of the world’s highest adult HIV prevalence rates at 14.3% (Ministry of Health, Zambia 2010). It
is estimated that in 2009, 1 million Zambians were living with HIV and 45,000 died of HIV related
causes (UNAIDS 2010). Stylists are aware of the pro-social nature of the task because of extensive
informational campaigns run by the Ministry of Health on the importance of condoms for HIV
prevention. In addition to the social benefit, condom sales might carry private benefit depending
on which compensation scheme the stylists are o ered, as described in the next section.
3.2 Research Design: Treatment Groups
Following the framework above, our experiment is designed to test the e ect of financial and non-
financial incentives on agents’ e ort and performance as indicated by the agent’s first order condition
(2.2). Agents are randomly assigned to one of four groups. Agents in the control group are hired
as volunteers and receive no incentives, financial or otherwise. This is a common arrangement in
organizations that rely on the help of community members.
The incentive schemes are designed to match the theoretical parameters m and r as described
above. In addition, we o er both small and large financial rewards to test the hypothesis that
motivation crowding-out is particularly detrimental to performance when rewards are small, as
argued in Gneezy and Rustichini (2000).
Agents in the small financial reward treatment group receive K50 for each condom pack
sold, a 10% margin over the retail price. K50 is the smallest bill commonly in circulation, making
this the smallest payment that is easily implementable. This treatment corresponds to a small m
in the theoretical framework.
9Monitors were instructed to stop attempting to visit stylists who could not be found for three consecutive visits,
i.e. three consecutive months. By the end of the experimental year 218 salons fell in this category. These stylists
however were still formally enrolled in the program, and they could have called the toll-free number to resume the
visits or restock condoms and are included in the sample throughout with sales of zero for each monitoring visit.
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Agents in the large financial reward treatment group receive K450 for each condom pack
sold, a 90% margin over the retail price. K450 is the highest incentive compatible reward, since
agents would have the incentive to buy and dispose of the condoms if the reward were larger than
the purchase price. This treatment corresponds to a large m in the theoretical framework.
Agents in the non-financial reward (stars) treatment group receive a star for each con-
dom pack sold. These agents are provided with a thermometer, akin to those used in charitable
fundraisers, which they are instructed to post in a visible location in the salon/shop. Each sale is
rewarded with a star stamped on the thermometer, which is labeled as measuring the stylist’s con-
tribution to the health of their community.10 The thermometer is designed to create a visual link
between packs sold and health outcomes, making social impact salient (Grant 2007) and e ectively
rewarding stylists for marginal contributions to the cause. In addition, stylists who sell more than
216 packs during the experimental year are invited to a ceremony at SFH headquarters together
with five guests of their choosing. During the ceremony, the stylist is awarded a certificate by a
well-known and respected figure in the health sector in Zambia. This treatment corresponds to a
large r in the theoretical framework.
The design of the non-financial reward scheme was driven by the need to balance two equally
important considerations. On the one hand, we needed the scheme to have commonly observed
features of non-financial rewards, such as the award of a certificate or a ceremony to top perform-
ers. This was key for realism and the generalizability of the findings. On the other, we needed the
financial and non-financial treatments to be as similar as possible on all dimensions so that any
di erence between them could be ascribed to the nature of the reward, rather than to the structure
of the incentive scheme, e.g. its convexity. For this reason, agents in all treatments earn rewards
for each pack sold and rewards are a linear function of sales. It is important to stress that adding
the ceremony to the non-financial treatment does not introduce elements of competition or a tour-
nament structure, as the ceremony is planned for all agents who reach the threshold. Therefore,
at low sale levels financial and non-financial incentives have the same linear structure, at high sale
levels the non-financial scheme has an additional lump sum benefit past a given threshold. Whether
this structural di erence can drive di erences in performance is a matter for empirical analysis.
In all treatment groups, rewards are calculated based on restocking decisions during the previous
monitoring visit and are paid by monitors at each monthly visit. To measure performance we use
restocking rather than sales because restocking can be precisely measured through invoice and
inventory data, whereas we cannot monitor sales directly and stylists might intentionally misreport
them or report them with error. It is important to note that none of the incentive treatments
makes it worthwhile for agents to buy stock if they do not plan to sell it. Indeed, even in the large
financial reward treatment, the reward is less than the price of a pack. Thus restocking choices are
10Ball et al. (2001) use stars to confer status in an experimental market and find that status is associated with
obtaining a greater share of the surplus in the experimental transactions, regardless of whether the stars are earned
based on performance in a trivia quiz or allocated randomly.
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a good proxy for sales. Finally, rewards are paid at the monthly visit after the re-stocking purchase
to avoid delegating the computation of rewards to the monitors and to make sure they have the
exact amount of rewards to distribute at each round.11
At the end of each monitoring visit, all stylists are told how many condoms they had restocked
the previous month and, when applicable, the reward they receive as a result, as well as the
number of potentially protected sexual intercourses resulting from the restocked condoms, linking
their e ort to the prevention of HIV/AIDS and unplanned pregnancies.12
3.3 Research Design: Randomization
To minimize the risk of spillovers between treatment groups, randomization is carried out at the
neighborhood level with bu er zones between neighborhoods, so that all agents in the same neigh-
borhood are assigned to the same treatment and salons’ neighbors are either in the same treatment
or not part of the program. To implement the design, we first conducted a census of all hair salons
in Lusaka, collecting GPS coordinates and numerous salon and stylist characteristics. We then
imposed a grid on the electronically mapped locations of the salons, to divide the city into equal
geographical areas of 650 square meters each. Within each grid cell, we cut out a bu er of 75
meters on each side. The resulting areas, each measuring 500 square meters, served as the unit
of randomization. Salons located in bu er areas were not invited to join the program. The final
sample for randomization consists of 205 distinct neighborhoods, containing 1222 hair salons.13
To increase power we balance on a vector of variables that are likely to a ect condom sales.
These are: salon type (hairdresser, barber or mixed), salon size (proxied by the number of employ-
ees), whether the salon is located near a bar (a proxy for condom demand), the number of salons
in the same cell, the agents’ total assets and whether the agent sells other products in their salon.
11All of our main results are robust to using sales based on stock observed by the monitor as our outcome measure.
Incentive payments are delivered 5 weeks after the restocking purchase to avoid delegating the computation of
incentives to the monitors. Though restocking decisions are o set by five weeks from incentive delivery, the di erent
incentive treatments do have the potential to influence the impact of liquidity constraints on restocking. Specifically,
stylists in either of the financial incentives may have more cash on hand after the delivery of incentives from restocking
during the previous monitoring visit. Monitors elicited restocking decisions before incentives were handed out to
mitigate this problem, however, if stylists changed their mind about restocking after receiving incentives, they were
allowed to purchase. We record these restocking decisions separately. Stylists in the high financial rewards treatment
do not change their decision significantly more than stylists in the volunteer control, which suggests that liquidity
constraint di erences do not have a meaningful e ect on restocking. Stylists in the star reward treatment, on the
other hand, do significantly increase their restocking decision after receiving their reward, relative to the volunteer
control group.
12The following script was read to all groups, including the volunteer control, at the end of the monitoring session:
“Now, I have good news for you today. Because of your hard work and great sales performance in the last month,
you have potentially protected. . . . . . sexual intercourses. You have therefore helped your clients protect themselves
against STIs and unplanned pregnancies.” In the reward treatments, they were also told “Because of your hard work
and great sales performance in the last month, you have earned a reward of . . . . . . (Kwacha or stars)”.
13Salons/shops that reported planning to close/move in the next sixth months were excluded from the sample, as
were neighborhoods that contained only one salon.
11
Randomization is implemented via the minmax T-stat method for the vector of balance variables
across 1000 random draws. Figure 1 illustrates the outcome of the randomization.
While randomization occurred before the training invitation letters were delivered, the letters
themselves contained no information on the assigned treatments, to minimize the risk of spillovers
during the course of invitation delivery. This also ensures that attrition between the randomization
and training stages is orthogonal to treatment, as shown in Section 4.1 below.
3.4 Research Design: Data Sources
The analysis will use six main sources of data on stylists and condom sales. First, we conducted a
census survey of all stylists in Lusaka, through which we collected information on characteristics of
both the salon and the respondent.14 Eligible respondents are defined as those in charge of the daily
management of the salon. These are typically the owner or the person managing the salon/shop
on behalf of the owner for at least 4 days a week.15
Second, during the training program we implemented a contextualized dictator game to elicit
incentive compatible measures of pro-social attitudes toward HIV causes. Participants were told
that, in addition to the show-up fee (K40,000), each of them would receive K12,500 which they
could keep for themselves or donate in part or in full to a well-known charity in Lusaka that provides
care to HIV/AIDS patients including antiretroviral treatment.16 The amount donated is taken as a
proxy for the agents’ motivation for the cause. Since this is likely to be correlated with the agents’
14The Census was carried out from July to September 2009; the survey lasted for an average of 35 minutes. Two
data collection teams worked concurrently. The first team consisted of scouts responsible for locating all salons and
collecting GPS data. The second team then visited the shop and carried out the interview. Information regarding the
business included the type and quantity of equipment owned (mirrors, chairs, roller trays, dryers, etc.), the number
of employees, the number and type of clients, the nature and prices of o ered services and products, the monthly
revenues and profit, and time since opening. Information on the manager included demographics, the stylist’s
peer network, employee status in the salon, monthly earnings, length of employment/ownership, other-regarding
preferences/attitude, and living conditions.
15 If the desired respondent was not present at the time of the monitor’s visit, an appointment was scheduled if
possible or the monitors returned on the following days. A maximum of three attempts were made.
16Specific instructions for the game were scripted and read out loud. The scripts read: “We have recently received
additional money for today’s training. As a consequence we have su cient funds to give each of you an additional
K12500. [This was in addition to the 40,000 show up fee]. You can choose how much of this sum to keep for
yourselves and how much to donate to Our Lady’s Hospice, a local charity that provides palliative care that includes
o ering ART (antiretroviral) treatment for their HIV patients. If you wish to donate, please put your donation in
the envelope provided with this form [form has pre-printed ID number on it] and drop it in the collection box. Note
that the amount you donate is totally up to you: you can give nothing, part of the K12500, or the entire thing. The
amount you contribute will be kept completely confidential. We will give you a few minutes to think about it. When
you’ve taken a decision, please drop your envelope in the box at the front.”While instructions were being read, the
helpers distributed identical pre-arranged packets of K12,500 in small bills to each participant. While the need to
collect individual measures of altruism obviously prevents us from guaranteeing full anonymity, the design ensured
that individual choices were not observable by other participants or by the training personnel. After receiving the
money, stylists were guided one at a time to one of 5 booths where they counted the sum and separated the amount
they kept from the amount they donated. The bills donated were place in an envelope sealed before leaving the
booth. Each participant then deposited themselves the envelope in a box specially designed for this purpose sitting
in front of the room.
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wealth, it is always used together with asset and socioeconomic status measures in the analysis
that follows.
Third, we use SFH inventory records to build a precise measure of restocking, i.e. agents’
purchases of condoms, with monthly frequency. This is the measure used to compute incentive
payments and is our main performance measure in the analysis that follows.
Fourth, monitors recorded restocking decisions and sales, and collected information on a number
of program related issues such as the visibility of promotional material at each monthly visit.17 In
addition, monitors checked the logbooks in which stylists were asked to record condom sales and
characteristics related to customers’ HIV risk profiles. While the monthly monitoring surveys are
a useful complement to the information gathered from SFH records, we do not rely on these as the
main source of data for the analysis since they are available only if the salon was open and the
trained stylist was present when the monitors visited their neighborhood. Overall, 60 percent of
all attempted visits are successful, and these are equally distributed across treatments.
Fifth, two months before the end of the program, we administered a customer survey to inves-
tigate the customers’ familiarity with the female condom distribution program through hair salons,
and their use of female and male condoms. This survey is designed to provide direct evidence on the
customers’ perception of the treatments, thus allowing us to shed light on whether the treatments
a ect sales by changing customers’ demand. 18
Finally, at the end of the program we re-administered the baseline census questionnaire aug-
mented by modules on business skills and on the agents’ own health behavior.19
4 Identification






c + uic (4.1)
17Five full time monitors were trained to carry out visits and they rotated between salons and treatments. Mon-
itoring visits lasted approximately one hour, during which monitors followed a detailed script and recorded both
observational and survey data. Besides collecting data, monitors answered queries about the program, distributed
promotional materials, allowed the stylists to restock and handed out incentive payments.
18To interview customers we selected 16 dense Lusaka markets, four for each experimental treatment. Surveyors
conducted random-intercept surveys with individuals in the markets by approaching every fifth individual entering
through the main market entry, and asked if they would be willing to answer a few questions. Once consent was
obtained, we asked whether the respondent frequented a hair salon in the market where the survey took place to
match customers with treatments. Customers were then asked a very brief set of survey questions about demographics,
familiarity with the female condom, sources of information, purchase behavior and own sexual practices.
19At end-line we re-interviewed 69 percent of the stylists from the original sample who attended training. At the
time of the end-line survey, stylists were reminded that the monitoring visits would not be continued but that they
would be able to restock female condoms directly from SFH sales agents if they wished to continue distributing the
product.
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where yic is a measure of condom sales by agent i located in area c over the year, and treatjc
denotes the three treatment groups. Errors are clustered at the level of the randomization unit, the
geographical grid cell area c, throughout. We estimate (4.1) on the entire sample of stylists who
came to training and hence were exposed to treatment. Since agents choose whether to participate
in the program after learning about incentives, the coe cients ”0j capture the e ect of incentives
on sales performance through both the margins of selection and e ort. In this setting, however,
the role of selection is limited since almost all the agents who are exposed to treatment join the
program. Section 5 presents detailed evidence on this issue.
The coe cients ”0j measure the causal e ect of the treatments on sale performance under the
identifying assumption that treatjc is orthogonal to uic. In support of this assumption, appendix
table A.1 presents the means and standard deviations of agents’ and salons’ characteristics in each
treatment, together with the largest normalized di erence between treatment pairs. Following
Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) we report normalized di erences as, in contrast with t-statistics,
they are scale invariant and do not mechanically increase with sample size. The table reports both
the variables used to balance in the randomization procedure and additional determinants of sales
used later in the analysis. Reassuringly, the randomization yields a sample that is balanced across
treatments; out of 66 pairwise di erences, only one is just above the rule of thumb critical value of
0.25.20 This notwithstanding, the identifying assumption fails if the decision to participate to the
training program is not orthogonal to treatment or if there are spillovers between treatments. We
discuss these in turn below.
4.1 Participation decision
Of the original sample of 1222 stylists chosen to participate in the experiment and randomly
allocated to one of the four treatment groups, 771 chose to come to training and were therefore
exposed to the treatments. Stylists drop out of the sample at two points between treatment
assignment and treatment exposure. First, 20 percent of the 1222 stylists assigned to receive
training invitations did not receive them because they could not be found during any of the three
delivery attempts. Second, 21 percent of the 981 stylists who received an invitation chose not
to attend the training. The identifying assumption fails if the treatments a ect selection at either
stage. However, since stylists were not informed about treatments until the end of training, selection






c +Xi÷i + Áic (4.2)
20This is the rule of thumb value below which linear regression methods are not sensitive to specification changes
(Imbens and Wooldridge 2009). The number of stylists reporting that profit is their primary motivator in their daily
work is 0.26 standard deviations higher for stylists in the stars treatment than for stylists in the volunteer treatment.
We control for this and all other stratification variables in the specifications below.
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where picis an indicator variable equal to 1 if the agent receives the invitation in columns 1 and
2, and an indicator variable equal to 1 if the agent chooses to attend training in columns 3 and
4. Xi is a vector of agents’ characteristics that can be correlated with the participation decision
and, later, with sales. Two findings are of note. First, the estimates in table A.2 clearly show
that the participation decision is orthogonal to treatment. All coe cients ◊0j are small and not
significantly di erent from zero. Second, the decision to attend training is correlated with some
individual characteristics such as gender (barbers are more likely to attend, perhaps since many
already sell male condoms), and self-reported donations to HIV-related causes. Stylists who attend
training are five percentage points more likely to report giving to HIV charities, which is a 23
percent increase over the mean. This is in line with the theoretical literature that suggests agents
in mission-driven organizations share interest in the mission (a low „ and/or a high ‡ in the model)
and has implications for agents’ response to financial and non-financial incentives compared to the
general population, which we will discuss in detail in the conclusion. We also note that the decision
to attend is positively correlated with the number of stylists operating in the same neighborhood,
suggesting peer e ects might be relevant in this setting, an issue we will return to when exploring
the mechanisms driving the e ect of incentives.
4.2 Spillovers
The identifying assumption fails if, because of spillovers, the control group is not a proper counter-
factual for how agents in the treatment groups would have behaved in the absence of treatment.
This might be the case if, for instance, agents in the control group change their behavior as a result
of knowing that other agents have been o ered rewards. Four design features were employed to
minimize the risk of spillovers across treatment groups.
First, we created a 250 meter bu er zone between each geographical area where salons are
located to ensure that each agent either neighbors other stylists in the same treatment group or
stylists who are not part of the program. While the research design ensures that all stylists in
the same geographical areas are assigned to the same treatment, this precaution can be undone by
stylists relocating after randomization is carried out.21 Relocated stylists were allowed to stay into
the program only if they moved within the same geographical area or to a new area with the same
treatment as their original assignment.
Second, stylists attended the training with other stylists belonging to the same treatment group.
Third, the enumerators who delivered the invitation letters were themselves unaware of which
training day pertained to which treatment. Finally, the program was designed to appear similar
across treatment groups to an outside observer. Most importantly, the sale price was identical
21Only 12 cases occurred where the salon moved and remained in operation, sta ed by the stylist involved in
the research project. In 7 of these cases, the salon relocated within the same treatment cell. Three of the cases
involvement movement into a bu er area and the remaining 2 cases involved relocation to a di erent treatment.
These salons were dropped from the program.
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across treatments and all stylists received the same promotional materials which included aprons,
“sold here” signs, t-shirts and di erent type of posters. The sole exception to this rule is the
thermometer poster, which was given only to stylists in the star treatment.
To assess the potential for spillovers through the stylists’ social network, our baseline survey
asked respondents about their relationships with other stylists in Lusaka. Reassuringly, the median
stylist reported only one connection, whether relative, friend or acquaintance, with another stylist
in the city. To monitor the evolution of this variable over the course of the program, we collected
information on new connections with other stylists during each monthly visit. During the first
four months of the program, 60 to 80 percent of stylists reported at least one new connection with
another stylist in the city. After the fourth month, very few new connections were reported. Over
90 percent of the new acquaintances reported during the first four months met during the training
and are therefore in the same treatment group. Finally, to detect spillovers and identify the stylists
who might be a ected by them during the course of the experiment, we asked monitors to note
all questions and complaints at every monthly visit. In over 7,000 monitor visits, only one stylist
asked about di erent incentive schemes.22
While these three pieces of evidence are reassuring, they cannot completely rule out that agents
in one treatment e ectively responded not being assigned to another. In the next section, we will
exploit variation in treatments of neighboring areas to assess the empirical relevance of this concern.
5 The e ect of incentives on sale performance
5.1 Baseline specification
We begin by evaluating the e ect of the three experimental incentive treatments on overall sale
performance during the experimental year. We measure sale performance by the number of packs
restocked over the year, namely the number of packs that agents purchase from SFH to sell in their
salons. Restocking is precisely measured from SFH inventory data and checked against invoices
signed by the agents upon purchase. Most importantly, restocking is the performance measure used
to compute financial and non-financial rewards.23 The di erence between sales to customers and
our measure of performance is the number of packs bought by the stylists but left unsold in the
salons. To measure sales to customers we asked monitors to record the number of condom packs
in the salons at every visit; sales to customers are therefore measured with error to the extent that
unsold packs might be not be displayed. Despite this, the correlation between the two measures is
0.92 and similar across treatments.
22Most questions regard queries that originated from customers on the characteristics of the product. The most
common complaint was that the condoms were di cult to sell.
23Accordingly, we do not count the first dispenser (12 packs) bought at training because no rewards were paid for
this.
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During the course of the experimental year, agents sold 13,886 female condom packs, of which
5,332 were sold by agents o ered non-financial rewards, and the remaining 8,554 is roughly equally
divided across the other three treatments. Figure 2 reports average yearly sales by stylists in the
four groups. Two patterns are of note. First, there is a striking di erence between stylists in the
star treatment and all the others. Agents in the star treatment sell twice as many packs (14 versus
7). Second, sales levels are generally low; even in the star treatment, the average stylist sells slightly
more than one pack per month. This is in line with qualitative evidence that female condoms are
di cult to sell. 24
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where yic is a measure of sales by agent i in area c, the variable treatc identifies the incentive
treatment agent i is assigned to, and Xi is a vector of salons’ and agents’ characteristics that can
a ect the willingness or ability to sell female condoms and therefore explain some of the variation in
sales. These include salon type (barber or hairdressers) and size, stylist’s sale experience, religion,
socio-economic status and wealth, and motivation for the cause. We report estimates of ”0j with
and without the vector of controls Xi. Errors are clustered at the level of the randomization unit,
the geographical area, throughout.
5.2 Selection
We estimate (5.1) on the entire sample of stylists who came to training and were exposed to the
treatments, regardless of whether they joined the program. The coe cients ”0j thus capture the
e ect of the incentive treatments on sales through both selection and e ort. In practice, however,
only 3 percent of the stylists who came to training did not join the program, hence incentives
have no e ect on selection as shown in columns 1 and 2 of appendix table A.3. Two points are of
note. First, to join the program stylists had to purchase a minimum of 12 packs at the subsidized
price of K2000, which corresponds to 2/3 of the average price of a haircut in our sample. The
fact that joining the program is costly allays the concern that the joining decision is moot, namely
that agents might have agreed to join without ever intending to participate actively. Second, since
the NGO is well known for using existing retail networks to distribute health products, and the
invitation letter stated the program was an opportunity to “help the community”, the stylists who
selected into training were probably willing to work for little or no reward. Table A.2 indeed shows
that the characteristics of the stylists who came to training di er from the general population of
24Stylists in our sample report that customers are afraid to try the product because of rumors about discomfort
or malfunctioning. Successful sellers report the need to follow up with customers at least once or twice, since the
product becomes easier to use with practice.
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stylists, in particular those who chose to participate are more likely to report donating to HIV
related causes. Taken together, these suggest that most selection took place before stylists knew
about the incentive treatment and hence it reconciles our evidence with earlier findings suggesting
that incentives a ect selection both in the field and lab (Bandiera et al. 2007, Dohmen and Falk
2011, Larkin and Leider 2011, Lazear 2000, Lazear et al. 2011).
Besides choosing to join the program at the beginning, stylists could also choose to quit during
the course of the experimental year at no cost. Only 58 stylists (7% of those exposed to treatment)
did so; of these 53 never made a sale. The e ect of the incentive treatments on the choice to select
out is small for all treatments and and significantly di erent from zero (p = 0.077) only for agents
in the small financial reward treatment as shown in Column 4 of appendix table A.3.
Overall, only 10 percent of the 771 stylists who were exposed to treatment select out of the
program either at training or later during the year, and the incentive treatments do not have a
substantial impact on either selection decision. This implies that the coe cients ”0j capture the
e ect of incentives on sales through e ort rather than through selection.
5.3 Sales
To measure the impact of incentives on sales, the first two columns of table 1 estimates (5.1) using
the total number of packs restocked as the outcome variable. Four findings are of note. First,
agents in the star treatment sell 7.66 more packs, which is over twice as many packs as stylists in
the control group. This result is robust to include stylist, salon and area characteristics.25 Second,
neither financial incentive treatment a ects sales. Both coe cients are substantially smaller than
the coe cient on the star treatment and not significantly di erent from zero. The null hypothesis
that the e ect of either financial treatment is equal to the e ect of the star treatment can also be
rejected at the 1% level. Third, we find that our experimental measure of motivation is correlated
with sales and the e ect is large: agents who donate more than the median amount to the HIV
charity sell 3.36 more packs, which is equal to 44 percent of the e ect of star rewards and over
50 percent of the baseline mean of 6.96 in the control group. To allay concerns that this captures
di erences in wealth, the regression includes a measure of the stylist’s own assets. This is correlated
with the value of donation, as expected, but not with sales. Since self-reported asset value might
be measured with substantial noise, we also use information on whether the agent has completed
25We note that agents in the large financial reward treatment face a lower marginal cost (50 instead of 500) and
could, in principle, have boosted sales by reducing the price. This incentive is common to all sales based bonuses and
quota schemes, i.e. sales people can increase sales by passing some of their reward to customers. This practice is not
detrimental to the principal as long as they want maximize sales revenues. Moreover, while this does not invalidate
the identification of the e ect of incentives on sales performance, it might cloud the identification of the e ect of
incentives on e ort. We do not observe agents choosing this strategy in equilibrium. Our follow up survey shows
that only four stylists reported ever selling a pack at a price lower than KW500, and none of them was in the large
financial reward treatment. This, of course, does not rule out that the agents tried lowering the price but this had
no e ect on sales, which is consistent with demand for this product being inelastic.
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primary education and whether they speak English, which are the best proxies of socio-economic
status in our setting. This measure is also correlated with donation but not with sales. Fourth, the
following agent’s characteristics are correlated with sales: barbers sell 3.32 more packs, possibly
reflecting the fact that men are in charge of contraceptive choices in our setting, promoters with
previous sales experience sell 5.18 more packs and Roman Catholics sell 3.65 fewer packs. The
e ect of the star treatment is thus larger than the e ect of any personal characteristic.
Columns 3, 4, and 5 estimate treatment e ects on the extensive margin and at di erent points
of the distribution of sales. The distribution exhibits bunching at 0, 12 and 24, probably due to
the fact that while stylists could purchase one pack at the time from SFH, buying one dispenser
(12 packs) saves on transaction costs. Overall, 62 percent of stylists sell no packs other than those
purchased at training, 22 percent sell between 0 and 12, and 16 percent sell 24 or more.
Column 3 of table 1 shows that the likelihood of selling at least one pack is 12 percentage
points higher for agents in the star treatment; this represents a 33 percent increase over the mean
of the control group. Agents in the high and low financial reward treatments are equally likely to
sell at least one pack as agents in the control group. Columns 4 and 5 show that the di erence
across treatments is stable at di erent points of the distribution in absolute value but it increases
in proportion to the mean level in the control group. Promoters in the star treatment are 13
percentage points more likely to sell 12 or more packs, which is 39 percent more than stylists in the
volunteer treatment, and 10 percentage points more likely to sell 24 or more, which is 80 percent
more than stylists in the volunteer treatment. Promoters who are o ered financial rewards, either
large or small, do not perform di erently than stylists in the control group. All coe cients are
precisely estimated and very close to zero.
Taken together, the evidence in table 1 indicates that non-financial incentives are e ective
at promoting sales in this context, whereas financial incentives are not. Before delving into the
mechanisms that underpin our findings, this section presents evidence on two issues that are key
for the interpretation of the findings.
First, we provide evidence that allays the concern that the estimated e ect of the non-financial
treatment might be contaminated by spillovers, namely by agents in other treatments reacting to
not having been given stars. As illustrated in figure 1, some non-star areas border neighbor areas in
the star treatments, whereas others do not. We exploit this variation to test whether the agents who
are more likely a ected by spillovers have higher or lower sales. Reassuringly, we find that being
close to agents in the star treatment does not a ect sales for agents in other groups, which casts
doubt on the relevance of spillovers in our setting. Of the 586 salons not in the stars treatment, 41
percent are located in areas adjacent to stars treatment areas. The estimated treatment e ect for
being adjacent to a stars area is 1.30 (se = 1.39).26
26Although the concern for spillovers might be strongest from stars, given the visibility of the thermometer, we also
check for spillovers from the financial margin treatments. Being in a cell adjacent to any financial margin treatment
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Second, we provide evidence that the treatment e ects are stable through time, thus ruling out
that the aggregate e ect of non-financial rewards on sales is due to the novelty of being o ered
star rewards, or similar forms of Hawthorne e ects. To do so, we exploit the fact that the SFH
inventory files contain the exact dates of restocking and estimate (5.1) in each month, using the
same set of controls and clustering errors at the level of the randomization unit as above.27 Figure
3 reports month-specific treatment e ects. Two patterns are of note. First, the e ect of the star
treatment is positive and of similar magnitude in all months except the fifth, when it is close to
zero. This might be due to the fact that the torrential rains in months 3 and 4 depressed sales,
so that agents could not sell the stock purchased in those months and did not need to restock in
month 5. The magnitude of the e ect is somewhat higher in the first two months and above the
mean of the control group in most months, implying that agents in the star treatment sell at least
twice as many packs as agents in the control group at any given point in time. Not surprisingly,
however, the e ect on monthly sales is less precisely estimated than on yearly sales. Second, the
e ect of both large and small financial rewards is close to zero in all months, suggesting again that
the aggregate results do not hide substantial heterogeneity through time.
We note that the observed pattern is also consistent with agents in the star treatment exerting
e ort only at the beginning to establish a regular customer base, and sell to the same customers
throughout the year. From the principal’s point of view this is not less desirable than reaching
new customers, but the interpretation of the e ect of stars through time di ers if this is the case.
To shed light on this issue we use the agents’ reports on whether the customers they sold female
condoms to had used them before. The share of sales made to customers who had never used a
female condom is naturally higher in earlier months (80% in month 1) but remains substantial in
later months (44% by month 10), suggesting agents were reaching out to new customers throughout
the program. More importantly for the interpretation of the treatment e ects, the share of new
customers does not decline faster for agents in the star treatment.
That the e ect of non-financial incentives is stable through time suggests that the e ectiveness
of the star reward is unlikely to be driven by the prospect of the ceremony. This can be inferred
from the fact that, given the volume of sales, the threshold for being entitled to the ceremony (216
packs sold in one year) was unattainable for most agents. Indeed, stylists who sold at least one pack
and who were assigned to stars treatment sold on average 3.1 packs per round, and only one stylist
managed to sell enough to qualify for the ceremony. Had the e ect of non-financial incentives been
driven by the ceremony component, it should have disappeared after a few months as most agents
realized the threshold was far beyond reach. The same logic suggests that the e ect of the star
has no statistically significant e ect on sales.
27In contrast to restocking data, which is available for each month of the year, customer sales data is only available
for the months in which the enumerators were able to find the stylists when visiting their area. Overall, 60% of the
visits were successful, and this does not vary by treatment. The most common reasons for a missed visit were that
the shop was closed or that the stylist was not present.
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treatment is not driven by the fact that agents in that treatment were given a number (216) they
might have used to form expectations about “reasonable” sales levels. Since sales were substantially
below the level needed to reach 216 over one year, this e ect should have also disappeared after
the first months.
6 Mechanisms
The evidence in the previous section indicates that, in this setting, non-financial incentives are
e ective at increasing sales, whereas financial incentives are not. This section provides evidence
on the mechanisms that underlie the treatment e ects estimated above. Since the evidence in
section 5 indicates that the di erence between treatments is stable throughout the duration of the
experiment, the remainder of the paper will focus on aggregate performance at the year level.
We begin by making precise the distinction between the e ect of incentives on the agents’ e ort
vis a vis their e ect on customers’ demand, since the e ect on sales can, in principle, be due to
changes in either. Guided by the theoretical framework we then go beyond the average e ects,
and allow the treatment e ects to be heterogeneous as a function of the agents’ motivation for the
cause (‡) or the weight they put on financial payo s („). This will shed light on the importance of
intrinsic motivation crowding-out in this setting and on whether non-financial incentives leverage
intrinsic motivation as indicated in the theoretical framework.
Finally we provide evidence on the practical relevance of two further di erences between financial
and non-financial incentives, namely that the latter are visible to other agents and can therefore
a ect motivation through social comparisons, and that they can provide motivation to all employees
in the salon if the star thermometer is publicly displayed.
6.1 Agents e ort vs. customer demand
While all stylists are given the same posters and other promotional materials, a key di erence
between the star treatment and all others is that only agents in the star treatment are given the
thermometer, which provides a visible measure of the stylists’ performance and their contribution
to the program. Visibility could, in principle, lead to higher sales for a given level of e ort through
an advertising e ect, if the clients are altruistic vis-a-vis the stylists and buy packs to make them
earn stars or if the clients take it as a signal of the agents’ type and buy packs because they
share their interest in the mission.28 Assessing whether stars result in higher sales because they
encourage e ort or increase demand is key for a correct interpretation of the findings and to derive
implications for incentive design.
28A related consideration is that the star treatment could have attracted more customers to the salon. We compare
the change in the number of salon customers between the baseline and the end-line across treatment groups and find
no significant di erences.
21
To this purpose, we first test whether agents in the star treatment behave di erently along
dimensions that are correlated with sales e ort as measured during the monthly visits. Our monthly
surveys contain four variables that can be used for this purpose. In particular, we test whether
the di erent incentive schemes a ect the quantity of promotional materials, such as posters and
“sold here” signs, displayed in the shop and the probability that the stylists fill in their logbooks
as instructed. In addition, we use monitors’ subjective evaluation of the stylists’ interest in selling
and promoting the female condoms and their judgement of the stylists’ attention level at the time
of each monitoring visit.
Table 2 reports the estimates of 5.1 using e ort proxies as outcome variables. We find that
agents in the star treatment display 0.25 more materials (11 percent more than the mean of the
control group), are 7 percentage points more likely to fill in their logbooks (15 percent more than
the mean in the control group), and score 0.10 more points or 1/7th of a standard deviation more
on the “interest” variable recorded by the monitors. Stylists in the two financial reward schemes
do not di er from the control group for any of these three measures of e ort. Finally, stylists in
all treatments appear to be equally interested during the monitor’s demonstration. Overall, the
results in table 2 indicate that, in line with the e ect on sales, non-financial incentives promote
e ort on three out of the four dimensions we can measure, while financial incentives do not.
Next, we test whether the star treatment changes customers’ behavior, leading to higher sales.
First, we survey customers to assess directly whether they report being a ected by the thermometer.
We ask customers whether they had seen promotional materials for female condoms in hair salons
and, if so, to describe what that they have seen. Overall, 37 percent of the interviewees report
having seen promotional materials. Of these, 92 percent had seen the promotional poster (which
is the largest and most visible of the materials distributed), 36 percent had seen the “sold here”
sign, and only 2 percent, or 15 people in total, report seeing the thermometer. This casts doubt
on the interpretation that the thermometer attracts more attention than the standard promotional
materials, giving stylists in the non-financial treatment an advantage in advertising.
Given the low sales volume, however, the customer survey might fail to capture the responses
of the small subset of customers who are indeed a ected by the thermometer. The second step
of our strategy consists of distributing a placebo star reward treatment to a random sample of
salons in the volunteer control group and the two financial treatments. In the 8th monitoring cycle
we distributed placebo thermometers to 113 randomly selected salons and standard posters to the
remaining 138 that were visited during that cycle. The placebo thermometer looks identical to
those given to stylists in the star treatment except that the number of stars reflects average sales
by all salons, rather than the individual salon sales. We then measure the e ect of the placebo
star reward on sales in the following month. The results, reported in columns 1 and 2 of table 3,
show that the placebo star reward has no e ect on sales. The estimated e ect of the placebo star
reward is 0.22 and not significantly di erent from zero, whereas agents in the star treatment sold
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1.58 more packs in their first month. Columns 3 and 4 explore the possibility that the e ect of the
placebo star reward is biased downwards because stylists might have unsold stock they might sell
from, and our measure of performance (restocking) fails to capture that. The results in columns 3
and 4 suggest that this is not the case, the e ect of the placebo star reward on measured sales is
-0.20 and not significantly di erent from zero. Overall, table 3 indicates that the thermometer is
not an e ective advertising instrument, casting further doubts on the hypothesis that non-financial
rewards a ect sales by changing customers’ behavior.
Taken together, the evidence so far suggest that the e ect of non-financial rewards is due to
stylists exerting more e ort, rather than the treatment boosting demand. The theoretical frame-
work makes precise that the e ect of financial and non-financial rewards on e ort depends on
the weight stylists put on monetary and non-monetary pay-o . The next two subsections provide
evidence on the empirical relevance of these mechanisms.
6.2 Heterogeneous e ects by social motivation
The theoretical framework makes precise that the agent’s motivation for the cause, namely the
weight ‡ they put on non-monetary payo , determines the e ectiveness of non-financial rewards
and, if there is motivation crowding-out, also the e ectiveness of financial rewards. The derivative
of optimal e ort with respect to the strength of non-financial rewards (2.4) illustrates that non-
financial rewards leverage or “crowd-in” motivation, namely non-financial rewards are more e ective
when the agent’s motivation for the cause, ‡, is high. In contrast, financial incentives can crowd-
out intrinsic motivation as illustrated in (2.3), and the strength of this e ect [‡(1 + r)cÕ(m)] also
depends on the agent’s motivation for the cause ‡. The evidence so far casts doubt on the relevance
of a specific form of crowding-out e ect, namely that crowding-out only dominates when financial
rewards are low powered, so that small rewards reduce performance while large rewards increase
it (Gneezy and Rustichini 2000). Indeed, our findings indicate that sale performance is the same
when there are no financial incentives, when financial incentives are low powered and when they are
high powered. In all specifications, the di erences are precisely estimated and close to zero. The
findings are consistent with two interpretations. First the parameters of both our financial reward
schemes could generate knife-edge cases so that the negative crowding-out e ect exactly balances
the positive e ect on monetary payo  both in the low and high powered incentive treatments.
Second, the average e ects reported in table 1 might hide the fact that motivation crowding-out
occurs only for agents who are motivated for the cause, namely those with ‡ > 0 in (2.3), if their
contribution to the average e ect is small.
To assess the empirical relevance of these mechanisms, we allow the e ects of incentives to be
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heterogeneous as a function of the agent’s motivation for the cause and we estimate:










c ú ‡i + uic (6.1)
where ‡i is the measure of stylist’s motivation (whose level is included in the vector of stylist’s
characteristics Xi) and all other variables are defined above. Our main measure of the agents’
motivation for the cause is their observed willingness to donate, which, as shown above in table 1
is a strong predictor of sales.
Results in column 1, table 4 indicate that indeed non-financial incentives leverage intrinsic
motivation: the e ect of non-financial incentives is large and precisely estimated only for motivated
stylists. In particular, stylists who donate more than the median amount in the experimental
dictator game and are assigned to the star treatment sell 10.0 (s.e. 3.2) more packs than the
control group (low motivated stylists in the pure volunteer treatment), while stylists who donate
less than the median amount sell 4.3 (s.e. 2.9) more packs. The p-value of the di erence is 0.096.
To provide further evidence on the interaction between treatment and agents’ motivation, we
use a self-reported measure of work motivation. In the baseline survey we asked stylists to identify
what they enjoy most about their job between “making money”, “being own boss”, “making people
look nice”, “being connected to the community”, and “other”. The share of stylists choosing
these are 35%, 6%, 44%, 14% and 1%, respectively. To measure work motivation we generate
a dichotomous variable coding the first two options as profit- and individually-oriented and the
second two as socially-oriented.29 Our measure proxies for the importance of social motivation
relative to individual motivation, that is ‡ relative to „. It is important to note that, in contrast to
the donation in the experimental dictator game, this variable measures agents’ motivation for their
main task rather than for HIV prevention/condom sales. While in the theoretical framework the
two are individual specific, in practice ‡ and „ might be task specific. The interpretation below is
valid as long as these are correlated across tasks performed by the same individual.
In line with the previous results, column 2 in table 4 show that the star treatment is e ective
only for socially motivated stylists. Those who rank socially-oriented motivations above other
motivations and are assigned to the star treatment sell 10.48 (s.e. 3.00) more packs than those
who indicate individual-oriented motivations and are assigned to the pure volunteer treatment.
The interaction of social motivation and the star treatment is large and positive but not precisely
estimated at conventional levels (p = 0.134).
The interaction between our motivation variables and the financial treatments provide evidence
on the relevance of motivation crowding-out in this setting, as the strength of this e ect [‡(1 +
r)cÕ(m)] depends on the agent’s motivation for the cause ‡ as illustrated in (2.3).
29Results are robust to alternative ways of coding the baseline survey responses, for instance by coding “being own
boss” and “other” as separate motivations.
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The findings in table 4 do not support the crowding-out hypothesis. Financial incentives are
ine ective both for stylists who are socially motivated and those who are not. In contrast to the
crowding-out hypothesis, the findings indicate that, if anything, high financial rewards actually
appear to reinforce intrinsic motivation; namely, the di erence between the e ect of high financial
incentives on high and low motivated stylists is positive with a p-value of 0.026 in column 1 and a
p-value of 0.144 in column 2.
That financial rewards are more e ective for high ‡ types also implies that financial and non-
financial rewards are complements in this setting. Indeed, from the optimal e ort response to
monetary incentives ((2.3)) we see that the sign of the cross-derivative with respect to ‡ has to be
the same as the sign of the cross-derivative with respect to r. In other words, while we do not directly
observe a treatment where both financial and non-financial rewards are o ered simultaneously, we
would expect the e ect of financial incentives to be stronger if they were o ered in combination
with non-financial rewards.
Our findings can be reconciled with the laboratory evidence on crowding-out (for example,
Ariely et al. 2009) by noting that most experiments that find evidence of crowding out rely on
the social image channel, namely on the fact that financial incentives reduce the reputational gains
from pro-social activities. In our setting, however, this channel is closed since the two financial
schemes and the control group were designed to be observationally identical to an outside observer
to minimize the risk of contamination via information spillovers. In particular, customers could
not observe whether agents were receiving rewards for condom sales, and all condoms were sold at
the same K500 price in all treatments. Since it is common practice for retail agents to receive a
margin on the price of the goods they sell, the most likely inference from the customer’s perspective
is that all hairstylists were paid monetary margins, but we cannot pin down customers’ beliefs in
our setting (or, more germane for our analysis, hairstylists’ beliefs about customers’ beliefs about
their motivation). More importantly, we would not expect di erential inference about incentives
across the volunteer and financial treatments, particularly since stylists in the volunteer control
group have no way to credibly signal that they were not getting paid. 30
Even if monetary incentives cannot a ect the agents’ social image, they can still crowd-out
intrinsic motivation through a self-signaling mechanism by which the agents receive less “warm
glow” because financial incentives make them re-assess their own motives for devoting e ort to the
task (Deci 1971). Our findings suggest that this is not the case.31
30In addition, qualitative evidence from focus groups in the field indicates no stigma attached to being paid for
pro-social tasks, possibly because Zambia is a very poor economy, and that tasks seems more valuable if a donor,
NGO or government is willing to pay for it.
31To minimize di erences across treatments other than those arising from the compensation schemes, agents in all
groups were reminded about their contribution to social value whenever they made a sale. This may have mitigated
the chance of agents re-assessing their motivation for the task.
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6.3 Heterogeneous e ects by financial preferences
Having ruled out that financial incentives are ine ective because they crowd-out intrinsic moti-
vation, this subsection presents further evidence on the mechanisms that drive the response to
financial incentives in this setting. The theoretical framework makes precise that the e ectiveness
of financial incentives depends on the weight „ the agents put on their monetary payo . Financial
incentives might be ine ective in this setting because the average „ is low. This is fairly plausible
because agents did not know which treatment they were assigned to until the end of the training
program. Since many NGOs rely on community members to volunteer, agents who came to training
may have been willing to join for little financial gain. To the extent that agents who are willing to
donate their time and e ort also put a low weight on monetary payo s, most agents in our sample
will have a low „.
To assess whether the e ect of financial incentives is heterogeneous we use two alternative
proxies for „, which correspond to two underlying reasons why agents might put di erent weight
on monetary gains. First, we exploit the fact that, under the assumption of concave utility, the
same amount of money is relatively more valuable for poor stylists. To proxy for socioeconomic
status we use information on the education level and English speaking ability of the stylist, and
classify as “low socioeconomic status” the 19 percent of stylists in our sample who either do not
speak English or have not completed primary education. In the absence of a reliable measure of
wealth, these are the best proxies of socio-economic status in our setting.
Second, we use information on whether stylists sell other products in their shops. Since most
products are sold on commission, a revealed preference argument suggests that stylists who do sell
other products, which represents 27 percent of the sample, might value commissions more. At the
same time, however, these agents might be at a corner solution where they devote all their e ort
to the product that yield the highest margin, and therefore do not respond to variation in margins
of other products. We estimate:










c ú „i + uic (6.2)
where „i is the measure of stylists’ motivation (whose level is included in the vector of stylists’
characteristics Xi) and all other variables are defined above.
Columns 3 and 4 of table 4 estimates heterogeneous treatment e ects along the two dimensions
of „i. We find evidence in favor of the hypothesis that financial incentives are e ective when
their relative value is higher, i.e. for low socio-economic status stylists. Compared to stylists
in the control group (high socio-economic status in the volunteer treatment), low socio-economic
status stylists sell 3.7 more packs when o ered large financial rewards and 4.9 more packs when
o ered small financial rewards. These di erences are not significant at conventional levels, but the
magnitudes of the e ects are large. Finally, the results in column 4 shows that the e ect of financial
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incentives does not depend on the stylists’ sales experience with other products.32
Taken together, the evidence in table 4 indicates that financial incentives are only e ective for
a minority of stylists, namely the poorest in our sample.
6.4 Social comparison
A crucial di erence between the treatments is that only the non-financial treatment enables stylists
to make their sale performance visible to third parties. Stylists can do so either by displaying the
thermometer in their salon or privately to the relevant parties. Enumerators’ records from monthly
visits indicate that, on average, the thermometer was publicly displayed in 43 percent of the star
treatment salons. This provides a lower bound to the share of agents who choose to make their
performance known to others since we do not observe whether they show it to selected individuals,
or post it at other times when the enumerators are not in the salon.
While the evidence in section (6.1) casts doubt on the hypothesis that the thermometer a ects
customer demand, an implication of the di erence in visibility is that stylists in the star treatment
can compare their performance to the performance of their peers in the same neighborhood, while
stylists in the other treatments cannot. This might elicit e ort if stylists are motivated by wanting
to outperform their peers, or if they are encouraged by the e ort of others dedicated to the same
cause. Referring to our theoretical framework, a larger peer group might increase the power of the
non-monetary incentive r.33
To shed light on the practical relevance of this mechanism, we allow the e ect of treatments to
vary with the number of potential peers in the vicinity of the stylist’s salons, that is the number
of trained stylists in the same geographical area. By design, the randomization procedures ensures
that the number of salons in each geographical area is balanced across treatments (see appendix
table A.1). This, together with the fact that selection into training is orthogonal to treatment,
implies that the average number of trained salons is balanced as well. The average area has 4.5
salons with a standard deviation of 5, and none of the tests of equality of means between treatment
pairs rejects the null. Reassuringly, the distribution of the variable is also similar across treatments,
and none of the pairwise Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests rejects the null of equality.
To evaluate whether the star treatment is more e ective when the peer group is larger we
estimate:










c úNc + uic (6.3)
32We also test for heterogeneous treatment e ects by stylist gender and find no significant di erences in sales
outcomes.
33In a recent field experiment Cohn et al (2011) show that workers’ performance is a ected by their pay relative
to the pay of other workers in their team.
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where Nc is the number of trained salons in area c, where the area is the unit of randomization
and covers 500 square meters. The specification thus controls for area specific characteristics that
a ect sales regardless of treatment. For instance, customer demand for condoms might be higher
in areas with more salons because more customers transit through these areas, or lower if there are
more alternative outlets. Also, stylists in denser areas might be more e ective sellers because they
face stronger competitive pressure. The coe cient “ captures these e ects.
Three findings are of note. First, the interaction coe cient between the number of peers and the
star treatment (”13 = 1.06; s.e. = 0.38) is statistically and economically significant. The magnitude
of the coe cient is such that the e ect of stars increases by 5.3 packs (70 percent of the average
e ect estimated in table 1) for one standard deviation increase of the number of peers. Figure 4
reports the marginal e ect of the non-financial treatment (”03 + ”13) evaluated at di erent values
of Nc with 95 percent confidence bands. The findings support the idea that the non-financial
treatment partly works by allowing social comparisons: non-financial incentives are more e ective
when the number of potential peers is higher. It is important to note that this finding does not
necessarily imply that stylists compete to collect stars; rather, stylists might be encouraged by
the e ort of others, or the ability to observe others’ performances helps the stylists assess what
is expected of them.34 This finding is robust to alternative sample restrictions, such as trimming
at the 95th percentile, and alternative functional form specifications, such as replacing Nc with an
indicator for whether Nc is above its median value.35
Second, the number of peers is not correlated with sales in the control group (“ = ≠0.052;
s.e. = 0.16). This allays the concern that density captures other area specific characteristics
that are correlated with sales. Third, the interaction coe cients between the number of peers
and the two financial treatments are small and not significantly di erent than zero (”11 = ≠0.18;
s.e. = 0.18; ”12 = 0.15; s.e. = 0.17). This addresses the concern that density captures area specific
features that make incentives more e ective, such as the di erential selection of stylists types
mentioned above.
To corroborate our interpretation that the interaction between the number of peers and the
star treatment captures the incentive e ect of social comparison, we note that agents in the star
treatment are significantly more likely to display the thermometer in their salons. One standard
deviation increase in Nc is associated with a 14 percentage point higher likelihood of displaying the
thermometer, a 23 percent increase from its mean value, and the correlation is precisely estimated.
Crucially, for the interpretation of our findings, this is not driven by agents choosing to advertise
34Further analysis, not reported, allows the e ect of non-financial incentives to be heterogeneous according to the
stylists’ motivation, the number of possible peers and the interaction of the two. The evidence favors the interpretation
that the two mechanisms act independently: both high and low donors sell more when surrounded by more peers,
but high donors sell more for any given number of peers.
35Further analysis, not shown, indicates that the distance between salons within the same neighborhood does not
a ect the e ectiveness of the star treatment, presumably because neighborhoods are su ciently small (500 square
meters).
28
more in denser areas, indeed the correlation between Nc and the likelihood of displaying posters or
the number of other promotional materials is small and not statistically di erent from zero.
6.5 Stars as public goods
Another key di erence between the financial and non-financial incentive schemes is that money is
divisible and can be given to specific individuals, while stars are not divisible and attributed to the
salon as a whole. In multi-person salons, only one person (the owner or general manager) receives
the financial reward, which she might share with the other employees if she sees fit, for instance to
reward employees for condom sales. However stars are stamped on the thermometer and cannot be
attributed to individual employees, and the thermometer does not bear the name of any particular
stylist working in the salon. A priori this di erence can make stars more or less e ective, depending
on the level of free-riding and the extent to which individual employees derive utility from common
stars.
To provide evidence on whether this mechanism is active in our context, we exploit the fact that
the di erence due to divisibility only arises in multi-person salons and test whether the observed
di erence between financial and non-financial incentives is driven by these. In our sample, 49
percent of salons are operated by a single person, 34 percent have two employees, 12 percent have
three and the remaining 5 percent have four or more. We find that the di erence between financial
and non-financial incentives is constant at di erent salon sizes, thus ruling out possible di erences
due to di erences in divisibility. One possible interpretation is that even multi-employee salons are
still quite small, and that the non-divisibility of stars would have more bite at larger salon size,
but in our context we can rule out that the e ectiveness of non-financial incentives is due to their
non-divisibility.
7 Conclusions
We conduct a field experiment to provide evidence on the e ectiveness of financial and non-financial
rewards for pro-social tasks. We find that agents who are o ered non-financial rewards (“stars” in
this setting) exert more e ort than either those o ered financial rewards or those o ered volunteer
contracts. Non-financial rewards elicit e ort by facilitating social comparisons among agents and
by leveraging the agents’ pro-social motivation. The magnitude of the e ects are such that, given
that non-financial rewards are considerably cheaper than financial incentives, they dominate all
other contracts on a cost-benefit comparison.36
We designed the incentive treatments to reward sales performance rather than usage, since sales
36Beside the cost of the actual rewards (the stars), the cost of non-financial rewards include both the upfront
expense necessary to figure out an e ective design and the cost of administering the rewards. In our setting the latter
was the same in all treatments as monitors attempted to visit all salons each month.
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performance can be precisely measured while usage cannot. It is nevertheless important to discuss
the link between sales and usage, since the health impact of the treatments depends on the latter.
We can provide two pieces of evidence indicating that customers indeed used the condoms. First, the
stylists’ logbooks, in which they are asked to record customer characteristics for every sale, reveal
that by the end of the experiment 56 percent of buyers had purchased female condoms at least
once before. This suggests the repeat customers must have used their previous purchases. Second,
in line with this, 13 percent of respondents to our customer survey report using the condom. The
customer survey data also reveals that the e ect of incentives on sales might actually underestimate
the e ect on usage. Indeed, while 16 percent of the respondents report receiving information on
female condoms from their stylists, and 13 percent report using it, only 0.5 percent report buying
from them, since respondents can obtain (unbranded) female condoms free of charge from health
clinics.
As is customary in field experiments, the interpretation of the findings and their wider appli-
cability depends on the key features of the specific setting. In our case, two features are of note.
First, to minimize the possibility of information spillovers among agents in di erent treatment
groups, agents were not informed of the existence or type of rewards when they were first invited to
participate in the training for condom distribution. This reconciles our finding that incentives do
not a ect the selection of agents into the job with earlier evidence from the private sector and from
the laboratory that suggests they do (Bandiera et al. 2007, Dohmen and Falk 2011, Larkin and
Leider 2011, Lazear 2000, Lazear et al. 20011). In general, we expect incentives to a ect selection,
since di erent schemes might attract di erent numbers and types of agents. This is likely to be
particularly relevant in the social sector to the extent that organizations are better o  by hiring
agents who are attracted by the mission, as opposed to a generous incentive scheme.
The fact that all agents in our experiment accepted the invitation to “help the community”
without knowing whether and how much they would be paid also sheds light on why agents who
were o ered financial rewards did not perform better than those who were asked to volunteer if
financial gains from this task might have a low utility weight for both sets of agents. Our results
are consistent with the possibility of financial rewards being e ective for agents with di erent
preferences, such as those who would have joined only if they known about financial compensation.
The second key feature of our setting is that the task at hand is not the agents’ main occupation.
This has two implications for the relative e ectiveness of non-financial vis-a-vis financial rewards.
First, we observe agents who have selected small entrepreneurship in the private sector as their
main occupation. Non-financial rewards might be more e ective for them because they reward the
only pro-social component of their jobs. On the other hand, if non-financial rewards interact with
the agents’ pro-social motivation, they might be even more e ective for agents who self-select into
the social sector as their main occupation.
Second, even with the most generous financial reward scheme, earnings from condom sales are a
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small fraction of overall earnings because both demand for the product and earnings from each sales
are low. Since demand for the product and the cost of e ort are orthogonal to treatment, our results
imply that the agents’ marginal utility of stars is higher than their marginal utility of money, given
their initial endowments of money and stars. In general we expect there to be a threshold level of
financial rewards such that all rewards above that threshold would be more e ective at eliciting
e ort than non-financial incentives, although not necessarily more profitable if financial rewards
are more costly. In line with this, we do find that financial incentives are e ective for poorer
agents for whom the marginal utility of money is higher. Likewise, the power of non-financial
incentives depends on their relative scarcity. In our setting no other tasks were compensated with
non-financial rewards. If non-financial rewards given for di erent tasks are substitutes, they might
be less e ective when they are used more widely.
While we implemented a specific type of non-financial rewards, the general design principles
are easily replicable and adaptable to other settings. Our rewards were a linear function of sales,
which minimized discouragement or gaming e ects typically associated with non-linear schemes.
Moreover, rewards were made clearly visible to third parties thus allowing social comparisons
between di erent agents engaged in the same task, which proved e ective at eliciting e ort. Finally,
they were awarded by a reputable and well-known organization, which might have contributed to
their value.
An obvious limit to the use of non-financial rewards is that they cannot replace money as the
main medium of compensation, and are thus of limited use in jobs where, due to the nature of the
agency problem, performance pay accounts for a large share of total pay. Our findings however
suggest that they can be a cost-e ective means to motivate agents in the many settings where the
fraction of variable pay over total pay is small. Ultimately, to assess whether non-financial rewards
can be e ective in other settings, future research will need to provide evidence on how the nature
of the reward interacts with the nature of the task to attract, motivate and retain employees.
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Table 1: Average treatment e ects on sales
Dependent variable
=1 if  sells 
at least one 
pack
=1 if  sells 
12 or more 
packs
=1 if  sells 
24 or more 
packs
Mean in control group 6.93 6.96 .368 .341 .128
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Large financial reward 0.769 1.179 -0.002 0.01 0.031
[1.618] [1.763] [0.067] [0.063] [0.042]
Small financial reward 0.378 0.812 -0.025 -0.018 0.011
[1.528] [1.547] [0.066] [0.060] [0.040]
Star reward 7.482*** 7.660*** 0.118* 0.131** 0.101**
[2.448] [2.554] [0.066] [0.066] [0.049]
Salon is a barbershop 3.316** 0.094** 0.093** 0.032
[1.611] [0.041] [0.042] [0.031]
Salon is both a barbershop and hairdressers 3.94 -0.05 -0.035 0.004
[3.944] [0.071] [0.071] [0.053]
Salon is near a bar 0.545 -0.048 -0.031 -0.005
[2.143] [0.074] [0.063] [0.050]
Salon size (log number of  employees) 1.557 -0.071 -0.062 0.036
[2.776] [0.066] [0.067] [0.049]
Number of  trained salons in the same area 0.027 0.001 0.000 -0.001
[0.087] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002]
Stylist sells other products in salon 5.183*** 0.084** 0.084** 0.073**
[1.718] [0.039] [0.040] [0.036]
Sylist is in the bottom quartile of  the asset distribution 1.159 0.007 0.000 0.018
[1.724] [0.051] [0.052] [0.035]
Sylist socio-economic status is low -0.998 -0.009 -0.012 -0.042
[1.410] [0.046] [0.047] [0.029]
Stylist's dictator game donation is above the median 3.364*** 0.152*** 0.143*** 0.016
[1.137] [0.031] [0.032] [0.028]
Stylist's reported work motivation is social -0.512 -0.035 -0.034 -0.03
[1.328] [0.036] [0.035] [0.032]
Stylist's religion is Catholic -3.652*** -0.084** -0.073* -0.035
[1.387] [0.042] [0.040] [0.033]
Constant 6.929*** 0.431 0.351*** 0.311*** 0.086
[1.123] [3.851] [0.098] [0.093] [0.073]
R-squared 0.0285 0.0659 0.0505 0.0485 0.0267
Observations 771 765 765 765 765
Number of  packs sold
Notes: OLS estimates. Standard errors clustered at cell level. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. We define an agent to
have low socio-economic status if the agent does not speak English or has not completed primary education. We define
self-reported motivation to be social if the agent reports "being connected to the community" or "making people look
nice" as their preferred aspect of  the job, in contast to "making money" and "being own boss".
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Table 2: Average treatment e ects on e ort measures






Mean in control group 2.23 0.45 2.53 2.13
Standard deviation in control group 1.6 0.5 0.64 0.69
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Large financial reward 0.072 0.03 -0.006 0.02
[0.093] [0.025] [0.031] [0.040]
Small financial reward -0.099 0.011 0.02 0.057
[0.090] [0.025] [0.031] [0.042]
Star reward 0.245*** 0.070*** -0.046 0.104**
[0.093] [0.025] [0.031] [0.042]
Constant 2.567*** 0.433*** 2.570*** 2.179***
[0.174] [0.049] [0.061] [0.075]
Controls yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.0333 0.0052 0.0074 0.0184
Observations 4607 4487 4563 4034
Notes: Pooled regressions at the month (monitoring round) level. Standard errors are
clustered at the salon level. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Total display is the sum of
promotional materials (not including the thermometer) displayed at the time of the visit.
Logbook filled is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the agent has filled the logbook.
Promoter attention is the monitor's answer to: "Rate the level of attention of the promoter
during the IPC (interpersonal communication) session (0-3)". Interest is the monitor's
answer to: "Rate the level of interest of the promoter to promote Care". All regressions
include the same vector of  controls as in Column 3, Table 1.
37
Table 3: Placebo star reward
Dependent variable
Mean in control group 0.71 0.67 0.68 0.68
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Placebo star reward 0.238 0.215 -0.149 -0.204
[0.334] [0.357] [0.287] [0.300]
Controls yes yes
R-squared 0.001 0.0409 0.0018 0.061
Observations 296 295 296 295
Notes: Standard errors clustered at cell level. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. The
dependent variable is measured as the number of packs restocked based on invoices
(Columns 1 and 2) or sold based on monitor calculations (Columns 3 and 4) in the
round following implementation of the placebo star reward treatment. Placebo
thermometer =1 if stylist received a thermometer poster reporting average sales of
condoms across stars treatment (12 packs). All regressions include the same vector of
controls as in Column 3, Table 1.
Sales (restocking) Sales (calculated)
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Table 4: Heterogeneous treatment e ects, by stylist motivation
Dependent variable is number of  packs sold
Motivation variable 
Stylist's dictator 
game donation is 
above the median
Stylist's reported 








Mean in Volunteer control group = 6.96
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Motivation variable 0.771 -3.631* -4.126** 3.545*
[1.531] [1.958] [1.610] [2.117]
Effect of  large reward when motivation variable =0 -2.364 -1.66 0.775 1.637
[1.642] [2.447] [2.091] [1.820]
Effect of  small reward when motivation variable =0 1.068 -0.321 -0.077 0.806
[1.936] [2.841] [1.719] [1.701]
Effect of  stars reward when motivation variable =0 4.341 3.858 7.016** 5.145**
[2.897] [3.816] [2.906] [2.110]
Effect of  large reward when motivation variable =1 3.546 2.63 3.682** -1.076
[2.490] [2.228] [1.839] [3.041]
Effect of  small reward when motivation variable =1 0.383 0.999 4.869* 0.534
[1.933] [1.768] [2.910] [3.102]
Effect of  stars reward when motivation variable =1 10.010*** 10.480*** 11.080*** 14.930**
[3.238] [2.986] [3.108] [5.816]
Controls yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.073 0.071 0.067 0.078
Observations 765 765 765 765
High financial X Motivation variable 5.910** 4.29 2.907 -2.713
[2.625] [2.921] [2.803] [3.126]
Low financial X Motivation variable -0.685 1.32 4.947 -0.272
[2.334] [3.257] [3.328] [3.450]
Stars X Motivation variable 5.668* 6.626 4.064 9.783*
[3.385] [4.400] [3.758] [5.099]
Notes: Standard errors clustered at cell level. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. All regressions include the same vector of controls as
in Column 3, Table 1. We define an agent to have low socio-economic status if the agent does not speak English or has not
completed primary education. We define self-reported motivation to be social if the agent reports "being connected to the
community" or "making people look nice" as their preferred aspect of  the job, in contast to "making money" and "being own boss".
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Figure 1: Randomization of map cells into treatment groups
Notes: Treatment groups and volunteer control group are shown by the cell colors. The
number of invited salons are written in each cell.
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High financial Low financial Volunteer Stars
95% confidence interval
Notes: Each bar measures the average number of packs sold over the year by agents in

































































































































































































































































































































0 5 10 15 20
Number of trained salons in cell
Notes: The solid line plots the imputed marginal e ect of the star treatment at each value of cell density. This is
computed as the sum of the coe cient of stars plus the coe cient of the interaction of stars and cell density multiplied
by the respective value of cell density estimated in a regression of sales on of sales on the three treatments, the three
treatments interacted with cell density, and controls listed in the footnote to Figure 3. The dotted lines represent the

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.2: Participation decision
Dependent variable
Mean in  control group = 0.80
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Large financial reward -0.005 -0.008 0.02 0.015
[0.033] [0.029] [0.042] [0.042]
Small financial reward 0.029 0.029 -0.023 -0.016
[0.034] [0.031] [0.042] [0.041]
Star reward -0.006 0.000 -0.042 -0.034
[0.031] [0.031] [0.046] [0.047]
Salon is a barbershop 0.060** 0.056*
[0.028] [0.033]
Salon is both a barbershop and hairdressers 0.023 0.028
[0.040] [0.053]
Salon is near a bar 0.023 0.067
[0.037] [0.050]
Salon size (log number of  employees) 0.044 -0.033
[0.039] [0.045]
Number of  salons in the same area 0.003*** 0.002*
[0.001] [0.001]
Stylist sells other products in salon 0.013 -0.006
[0.026] [0.032]
Sylist is in the bottom quartile of  the asset distribution -0.057* -0.004
[0.033] [0.036]
Sylist socio-economic status is low 0.014 -0.069*
[0.025] [0.036]
Stylist gives to HIV causes 0.025 0.055**
[0.025] [0.026]
Stylist's reported work motivation is social 0.035 0.003
[0.023] [0.028]
Stylist's religion is Catholic 0.011 0.021
[0.025] [0.026]
Constant 0.799*** 0.648*** 0.767*** 0.707***
[0.021] [0.062] [0.032] [0.075]
R-squared 0.0012 0.0164 0.0032 0.0218
Observations 1222 1216 981 977
Notes:Coefficients are marginal effects from a probit model. Errors clustered at the cell level. * p<0.10 **
p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Variables are as described in Table A.1 with the exception of Stylist gives to HIV causes
which is binary self-reported measure of  giving to people living with HIV/AIDS.
Received invitation Attended training
Conditional on assigned to program Conditional on received invitation
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Table A.3: Treatment e ects on selection
Dependent variable
Mean in Volunteer control group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Large financial reward -0.009 -0.015 0.000 -0.001
[0.016] [0.010] [0.025] [0.024]
Small financial reward -0.017 -0.012 0.059** 0.051*
[0.016] [0.011] [0.034] [0.033]
Star reward -0.017 -0.015 0.051* 0.049
[0.015] [0.010] [0.034] [0.034]
Salon is a barbershop 0.015 -0.003
[0.013] [0.022]
Salon is both a barbershop and hairdressers -0.003 -0.049*
[0.021] [0.018]
Salon is near a bar 0.007
[0.025]
Salon size (log number of  employees) -0.003 0.091***
[0.020] [0.029]
Number of  trained salons in the same area 0.001* 0.000
[0.000] [0.001]
Stylist sells other products in salon 0.013 -0.002
[0.012] [0.021]
Sylist is in the bottom quartile of  the asset distribution -0.005 0.001
[0.009] [0.023]
Sylist socio-economic status is low -0.011 -0.005
[0.011] [0.021]
Stylist's dictator game donation is above the median 0.031*** -0.002
[0.010] [0.014]
Stylist's reported work motivation is social -0.012 -0.009
[0.010] [0.016]
Stylist's religion is Catholic 0.01 -0.015
[0.013] [0.019]
Pseudo R-squared 0.0094 0.1045 0.0163 0.0418
Observations 771 766 771 765
Stylist quit after joiningStylist did not join program
0.052
Notes: Coefficients are marginal effects from probit model. Errors clustered at the cell level. *
p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Variables are as described in Table A.1. The variable describing
proximity to a bar is dropped in column (2) since it is perfectly collinear with the dependent variable.
0.042
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